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Abstract
Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, e.g. in stock markets to determine
stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions
of dollars in the process. A bidder, participating in such PDAs, has to plan for bids in the current auction as well as for
the future auctions, which highlights the necessity of good bidding strategies. In this paper, we perform an equilibrium
analysis of single unit single-shot double auctions with a certain clearing price and payment rule, which we refer to as
ACPR, and find it intractable to analyze as number of participating agents increase. We further derive the best response
for a bidder with complete information in a single-shot double auction with ACPR. Leveraging the theory developed for
single-shot double auction and taking the PowerTAC wholesale market PDA as our testbed, we proceed by modeling the
PDA of PowerTAC as an MDP. We propose a novel bidding strategy, namely MDPLCPBS. We empirically show that
MDPLCPBS follows the equilibrium strategy for double auctions that we previously analyze. In addition, we benchmark
our strategy against the baseline and the state-of-the-art bidding strategies for the PowerTAC wholesale market PDAs,
and show that MDPLCPBS outperforms most of them consistently.
1 Introduction
Auctions are mechanisms which facilitate buying and selling of goods or items amongst a group of agents. Double
auctions are prevalent when both the sides of a market actively bid. For example, in the New York Stock Exchange,
opening prices are determined using double auctions Parsons et al. [2011]. In smart grids, multiple power generating
companies and different distributing agencies (brokers) trade electricity in the wholesale markets using double auctions.
In this work, we focus primarily on electricity markets. In July 2019, approximately 1.2 Billion Euros worth electricity
was traded in Nord Pool alone, with 52% of the volume being traded using APIs Nord Pool AS [2019]. Any small
improvement in cost optimization by deploying better bidding strategies can lead to significant improvements in the
profits of the distributing agencies. Motivated by this, we take up a formal game-theoretic approach in this work for
devising bidding strategies.
Typically, for double auctions, clearing price and payment rules differ from market to market. Equilibrium analysis of
double auctions has been explored extensively with different payment and clearing price rules Wilson [1992]. Specifically,
for k-double auctions, Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) proved the existence of multiple non-trivial equilibria for k ∈
[0, 1]. They also focused on a class of well-behaved equilibria, by making generalist assumptions on buyer’s and seller’s
bidding strategies. Our focus in this paper is Average Clearing Price Rule (ACPR) based Periodic Double Auctions
(PDAs), commonly used in smart grids (Power TAC Ketter et al. [2017]). In ACPR, the clearing price set as the average
of last executing bid and last executing ask (a special case of k-double auction with k = 0.5).
For ACPR, Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) constructed a symmetric equilibrium for the case of one buyer and one
seller with uniformly distributed valuations. However, in the vast literature of double auctions, a generic equilibrium
analysis for ACPR with more buyers has not been well explored Wilson [1992]. We take up a double auction with ACPR
as a case study. We assume all the agents involved (buyers and sellers) deploy scaling based strategies, and identify the
Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the induced game. Researchers have used fictitious play-based convergence to equilibrium
(e.g., Shi et al. [2010]) in double auctions. However, such strategies are not useful in PDAs when the agents need to
place bids in real-time for new auctions. In such settings, we believe scaling based strategies are easy to interpret and
implement. The equilibrium analysis of non-linear or other complex forms are analytically difficult to compute; moreover
may not be appealing to the real users of these markets.
We characterize NEs for One Buyer and One Seller (OBOS) and Two Buyer and One Seller (TBOS) analytically
(Theorem 1 and 2). Given our assumption of scaling based bidding strategies and uniform type distributions, generic
equilibrium analysis of double auctions, following ACPR, beyond these settings is challenging. To test our double auction
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strategies, we take the help of the PowerTAC simulation environment. PowerTAC is a simulation platform that replicates
crucial elements of the smart grid, where multiple distributing agencies (brokers) compete across markets to generate the
most profit. Note that, the double auctions in PowerTAC; for that matter actually in electricity markets; are PDAs. In
PDAs, the market clears multiple times, each after a specific time interval.
Now, if a buyer knows all the bids in a double auction, we argue that it is a best response for the buyer to bid as
close as possible to the last clearing bid in order to procure the full required energy (Proposition 1). However, in reality,
buyers never have access to such information. To address this incomplete information, we model the bidding process
in PowerTAC PDAs as a Markov Decision Process (MDP), and solve it using dynamic programming and Last Clearing
Price (LCP) prediction. Motivated by Power TAC’s fast response time constraints, we propose a PDA bidding strategy
MDPLCPBS (Algorithm 1). Though our MDP formulation is inspired by Urieli and Stone (2014), the novelty lies in
the reward, solution, and application to place bids. First, we illustrate that the MDP based strategy indeed achieves the
equilibrium strategy characterized for OBOS setting. Then, we conduct different experiments to compare MDPLCPBS
with the following strategies: ZI Gode and Sunder [1993], ZIP Tesauro and Das [2001], TacTex Urieli and Stone [2014],
and MCTS Chowdhury et al. [2018]. Our analysis shows that MDPLCPBS outperforms ZI, TacTex, and ZIP in all the
cases, and closely matches with MCTS. Simultaneously, we show that it predicts the LCP with minimal error. We used
this bidding strategy to great effect during PowerTAC 2018 Finals Ghosh et al. [2019a] Ghosh et al. [2019b].
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We analytically characterize NE strategies for OBOS and TBOS settings (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2).
• We propose the best response in a complete information multi-unit double auction.
• For bidding in PDAs such as PowerTAC, we design an algorithm MDPLCPBS (Algorithm 1). It is based on dynamic
programming and LCP prediction.
• Experimentally, we validate that MDPLCPBS achieves the equilibrium characterized for OBOS setting. Further,
we demonstrate its efficacy against state of the art strategies for PowerTAC, and also show that it predicts the LCP
with minimal error.
2 Definitions & Background
We first define all the required terms formally.
Definition 1. (Periodic Double Auction (PDA)) A type of auction, for buying and selling some resource, with multiple
discrete clearing periods i.e. clearing after a specific time interval. Potential buyers submit their bids and potential
sellers simultaneously submit their asks to an auctioneer. Then the auctioneer matches the bids and asks, and chooses
some clearing price, denoted as CP , that clears the auction Wurman et al. [1998]. The allocation rule determines the
quantity bought/sold by each buyer/seller, while the payment rule determines how much each buyer/seller pays/earns for
buying/selling that quantity.
Definition 2. (Last Clearing Bid/Ask (LCB/LCA)) Last Clearing Bid (Ask) of an auction refers to that partially or fully
cleared bid (ask) which has the lowest (highest) limit-price. It is referred to as “last clearing” since it is the last bid (ask)
to be cleared by the clearing mechanism of the auction.
Definition 3. (Last Clearing Price (LCP)) Last Clearing Price (LCP) of bids (asks) refers to the limit-price of the Last
Clearing Bid (Ask).
Definition 4. (The k-Double Auction) If a buyer and seller participate in a double auction, and if the sealed bid b by the
buyer is higher than the sealed bid s by the seller, then CP is given by kb+ (1− k)s for some fixed k ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 5. (Average Clearing Price Rule (ACPR)) In a double auction, the clearing price and payment rule is ACPR if
the clearing price is given by (b+ s)/2 where b is the last executed bid, and s is the last executed ask. It is a special case
of k-double auction, with k = 0.5.
Consider a game Γ = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉, where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players, Si is the strategy set of
the player i, and ui : S1 × S2 × . . .× Sn → R for i = 1, 2, . . . n are utility functions.
Definition 6. (Best Response) Given a game Γ, the best response correspondence for player i is the mapping Bi : S−i →
Si defined by Bi(s−i) = {si ∈ Si : ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i)∀s′i ∈ Si}. That is, given a profile s−i of strategies of the
other players, Bi(s−i) gives the set of all best response strategies of player i.
Definition 7. (Nash Equilibrium) Given a game Γ, a strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2, . . . , s∗n) is said to be a Nash Equilibrium
of Γ if, ui(s∗i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i)∀si ∈ Si,∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n. That is, each player’s Nash Equilibrium strategy is a best
response to the Nash Equilibrium strategies of the other players.
2
Definition 8. (Markov Decision Process (MDP) Puterman [1994]) A Markov Decision Process (MDP) is a tuple given
by M = (S,A, P, r, γ) where S is the set of states, A is the set of actions, P is the state transition probability function,
where P (s′|s, a) = P (st+1 = s′|st = s, at = a) is the probability that action a in state s at time t will lead to state s′ at
time t+ 1, r is the reward function, with r(s, a) denoting the reward obtained by taking action a in state s, and γ ∈ [0, 1]
is the discount factor.
PowerTAC In this work, we focus more on smart grids. The Power Trading Agent Competition (PowerTAC) Ketter et
al. [2017] environment simulates a smart grid for approximately 60 days, where multiple brokers compete against each
other across three markets - tariff, wholesale and balancing market - to generate the most profit. Each broker maintains
a portfolio of consumers and producers, and buys and sells energy in the wholesale market. The broker with the highest
bank balance at the end of the simulation, wins the game. We use the PowerTAC simulator to benchmark our bidding
strategy.
The PowerTAC wholesale market employs PDAs for wholesale market energy trading. The clearing price and pay-
ment rule for the PowerTAC PDA, is given byACPR. Three types of entities participate in these auctions - (1) Generating
Companies (GenCos), (2) Miso Buyer, and (3) PowerTAC brokers. GenCos place only asks to sell energy, while the Meso
Buyer places very low bid prices to buy energy. The PowerTAC brokers are free to place a bid or an ask depending on
their requirement, or not place a bid at all.
The brokers can always participate in 24 auctions to trade energy, one auction for each of the next 24 timeslots. Each
broker is notified about identity of other brokers participating in the PDAs at the beginning of the simulation. Each broker
estimates its own energy requirement, and knows its own type. However, it does not know the types and requirements of
the competing brokers. Every broker is allowed to submit an unlimited number of bids for each auction. After clearance,
the clearing price and total cleared quantity of the auction is made public to all the brokers, while the last cleared bid or
ask is not revealed. Additionally, each broker is privately notified about the cleared quantity and clearing price of any
of its cleared bids/asks. The orderbook of the auction, which is the set of uncleared bids and asks without identity of
the bidders, is also made public to all the brokers. If a broker fails to balance its retail demand portfolio after all the
24 auctions in the wholesale market, the balancing market automatically supplies the energy while charging the broker a
balancing-price for its imbalance. The balancing-price is comparatively higher than the wholesale market price, and
is meant to penalize the broker for having an imbalance. For more details about the PowerTAC simulation, we refer the
reader to the Power TAC 2018 Game Specification Ketter et al. [2017].
3 Related Work
Most bidding strategies for double auctions are designed for Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs) and would need to
be modified for PDAs. Bidding strategies for PDAs, outside PowerTAC, are very limited. Wah et al. (2016) showed
that in equilibrium, slow traders have higher welfare compared to fast traders in PDAs. As for bidding strategies for the
PowerTAC wholesale market, AstonTAC Kuate et al. [2013] uses Non-Homogeneous Hidden Markov Models (NHHMM)
to predict energy demand and clearing price, which are then fed to an MDP to determine bid prices. TacTex Urieli and
Stone [2014, 2016a,b] uses an MDP and dynamic programming based strategy derived from Tesauro and Bredin’s bidding
strategy to predict bid prices, which is the motivation for our MDP-based strategy. Chowdhury 2016 predicts bid prices
for the wholesale market PDAs using REPTree, Linear Regression and NN with weather data, with the former being is
used in the SPOT Chowdhury et al. [2017] broker. Chowdhury et al. 2018 use a Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) based
strategy coupled with a REPTree based price predictor Chowdhury [2016] and heuristics, to determine optimal bid prices.
AgentUDE O¨zdemir and Unland [2015] uses an adaptive Q-learning based strategy in the wholesale market. None of
these strategies are backed up by game theoretic analysis, where as our work is to build strategies derived from Nash
Equilibrium.
4 Theoretical Approach and Proofs
In this section, we focus solely on the best response and Nash Equilibrium analysis of double auctions.
4.1 Nash Equilibrium analysis in single unit Double Auctions
Consider a single unit double auction, with the clearing price and payment rule given by ACPR. To find a generic Nash
Equilibrium in this setting, we first try to simplify the double auction by restricting the number of buyers and sellers and
their behavior. Upon doing so, we derive the following case-wise results.
4.1.1 One buyer and One Seller (OBOS)
Let’s assume that one buyer and one seller participate in the double auction, with their types as θB and θS respectively.
We assume that both deploy scaling based strategies, i.e., a bid by a buyer is bB = αBθB and an ask by the seller is
3
bS = αSθS where αB and αS are the scale factors by which the buyer and seller scale their true types while bidding,
respectively. Motivated by the literature Rothkopf [1980] Vincent [1995] Narahari [2014], we choose scale based bidding
strategies for this Nash Equilibrium analysis, as compared to additive bidding strategies.
We assume θB ∼ U [lB , hB ] and θS ∼ U [lS , hS ] and this is common knwoledge. We also assume Equation (1), which
states that the buyer’s bid (seller’s ask) at any point will be less (higher) than or equal to the highest (lowest) possible
seller’s ask (buyer’s bid).
αB
αS
θB ≤ hS , αS
αB
θS ≥ lB (1)
Thus, the utility of the buyer if its bid gets cleared, is denoted by the difference of true valuation and clearing price. Given
the true types are picked over a distribution, the expected utility is computed as:
uB =
∫ αB
αS
θB
lS
[
θB −
(αBθB + αSθS
2
)]
dθS
=
∫ αB
αS
θB
lS
[(
1− αB
2
)
θB − αSθS
2
]
dθS
= θB
(
1− αB
2
)(αB
αS
θB − lS
)− αS
4
[(αB
αS
θB
)2 − l2S]
(2)
Now assuming that the buyer decides to fix its αB before even seeing its own type, then its utility is given by:
UB =
∫ hB
lB
uBdθB
=
∫ hB
lB
[
θB
(
1− αB
2
)(αB
αS
θB − lS
)− αS
4
[(αB
αS
θB
)2 − l2S]]dθB
=
(h3B − l3B
3
)(αB
αS
− 3α
2
B
4αS
)− lS(1− αB
2
)(h2B − l2B
2
)
+
αS
4
l2S
(
hB − lB
)
(3)
Now, differentiating w.r.t. αB and equating to 0 to find maxima:
∂UB
∂αB
= 0
⇒ (h3B − l3B
3
)( 1
αS
− 3αB
2αS
)
+ lS
(h2B − l2B
4
)
= 0
⇒ αB = 2
3
+
αSlS
2
(h2B − l2B
h3B − l3B
) (4)
Similarly, for the seller, the utility comes out to be:
uS =
∫ hB
αS
αB
θS
[(αBθB + αSθS
2
)− θS]dθB
=
∫ hB
αS
αB
θS
[αB
2
θB + (
αS
2
− 1)θS
]
dθB
=
αB
4
(
h2B − (
αS
αB
θS)
2
)
+ θS(
αS
2
− 1)(hB − αS
αB
θS
)
(5)
Again, assuming that the seller decides to fix its αS before even seeing its own type, then its utility is given by:
US =
∫ hS
lS
uSdθS
=
αBh
2
B
4
(h2S − l2S)−
α2S
12α2B
(h3S − l3S) + hB(
αS
2
− 1)(h
2
S − l2S
2
)− (αS
2
− 1)αS
αB
(
h3S − l3S
3
)
(6)
Now, differentiating w.r.t αS and equating to 0 to find maxima
∂US
∂αS
= 0
⇒ (h
3
S − l3S
3
)
[− αS
2αB
+
1
αB
− αS
αB
]
+ hB(
h2S − l2S
4
) = 0
⇒ αS = 2
3
+
αBhB
2
(
h2S − l2S
h3S − l3S
)
(7)
4
Next, simplifying the expressions for αB and αS by letting
h2B−l2B
h3B−l3B
= x and h
2
S−l2S
h3S−l3S
= y, we get
αS =
2
3
+
αBhBy
2
⇒ αS = 2
3
+
hBy
2
(
2
3
+
αSlSx
2
)
⇒ αS = 4
3
(
2 + hBy
4− lShBxy
) (8)
αB =
2
3
+
αSlSx
2
⇒ αB = 2
3
+
lSx
2
4
3
(
2 + hBy
4− lShBxy
)
⇒ αB = 4
3
(
2 + lSx
4− lShBxy
) (9)
Putting lS = lB = 0 and hS = hB = 1 in Equations (8) and (9), we get αS = 1 and αB = 23 . The above discussion is
summarized as the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For a single unit double auction with ACPR, with only one buyer and one seller, whose true types are drawn
from a 0−1 uniform distribution, if they deploy scaling based bidding strategies bB and bS which satisfy Equation (1) and
fix their scaling factors αB and αS before seeing their true types, then αS = 1 and αB = 23 constitute a Nash Equilibrium.
4.1.2 Two Buyers and One Seller (TBOS)
Let’s assume that two buyers B1 and B2, and one seller participate in the double auction, with types θB1, θB2 and θS
respectively. We assume that all deploy scaling based strategies, and both buyers have the same scaling factor αB . Thus,
a bid by buyer B1 is bB1 = αBθB1 and by buyer B2 is bB2 = αBθB2, while a bid by the seller is bS = αSθS . We also
assume Equation (10), which states that the first buyer’s (seller’s) bid at any point will be less than or equal to the highest
possible seller’s (buyer’s) bid.
αB
αS
θB1 ≤ hS , αS
αB
θS ≤ hB (10)
First, we find the utility of the first buyer. We consider the following cases:
1. bB1 ≥ bB2 ⇒ θB1 ≥ θB2 and bB2 ≥ bS ⇒ θS ≤ αBαS θB2
Let the utility in this case be denoted by ub11.
ub11 =
∫ θB1
lB
[ ∫ αB
αS
θB2
lS
[
θB1 −
(αBθB2 + αSθS
2
)]
dθS
]
dθB2
=
∫ θB1
lB
[
− 3α
2
B
4αS
θ2B2 + (
αB
αS
θB1 +
αBlS
2
)θB2 + (−lSθB1 + l
2
SαS
4
)
]
dθB2
= θ3B1(− α
2
B
4αS
+
αB
2αS
) + θ2B1(
αBlS
4
− lS) + θB1(−αBl
2
B
2αS
+ lSlB +
l2SαS
4
) + (
α2Bl
3
B
4αS
− αBlSl
2
B
4
− αSlBl
2
S
4
)
(11)
2. bB1 ≥ bS ⇒ θB1 ≥ αSαB θS and bB2 ≤ bS ⇒ θB2 ≤ αSαB θS
Let the utility in this case be denoted by ub12.
ub12 =
∫ αB
αS
θB1
lS
[ ∫ αS
αB
θS
lB
[
θB1 −
(αBθB1 + αSθS
2
)]
dθB2
]
dθS
=
∫ αB
αS
θB1
lS
[
θB1(1− αB
2
)(
αS
αB
θS − lB)− αS
2
(
αS
αB
θS − lB)θS
]
dθS
= θ3B1(− 5α
2
B
12αS
+
αB
2αS
) + θ2B1lB(
3α2B
4αS
− αB
αS
) + θB1(−αSl
2
S
2αB
+
αSl
2
S
4
+ lBlS − αBlBlS
2
) + (
α2Sl
3
S
6
− αSlBl
2
S
4
)
(12)
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Now assuming that the first buyer decides to fix its αB before even seeing its own type, then we find the utility to be -
UB1 =
∫ hB
lB
uB1dθB1 =
∫ hB
lB
(ub11 + ub12)dθB1
=
∫ hB
lB
[
θ3B1(−
2α2B
3αS
+
αB
αS
) + θ2B1(
αBlS
4
− αBlB
αS
+
3α2BlB
4αS
− lS)
+ θB1
(
2lBlS − αBl
2
B
2αS
− αSl
2
S
2αB
+
αSl
2
S
2
− αBlBlS
2
)
+ (
α2Bl
3
B
4αS
− αBlSl
2
B
4
− αSlBl
2
S
2
+
α2Sl
3
S
6
)
]
dθB1
(13)
Now, differentiating w.r.t αB and equating to 0 to find maxima
∂UB1
∂αB
= 0
⇒
[
(hB − lB)
(αBl3B
2αS
− lSl
2
B
4
)
+ (
h2B − l2B
2
)
(
− l
2
B
2αS
+
αSl
2
S
2α2B
− lBlS
2
)
+ (
h3B − l3B
3
)
(
lS
4
− lB
αS
+
3αBlB
2αS
)
+ (
h4B − l4B
4
)(−4αB
3αS
+
1
αS
)
]
= 0
⇒
[
αB
6αS
(−2h3B + 4l3B + l2BhB − 2lBh2B) +
αS
4α2B
(hBl
2
S + lBl
2
S)
+
lS(h
2
B − 2l2B − 2hBlB)
12
+
3h3B − 4l3B − 4hBl2B − lBh2B
12αS
]
= 0
(14)
Similarly, for the seller we find the utility. We again have 4 cases:
1. bB1 ≥ bB2 ⇒ θB1 ≥ θB2 and bB2 ≥ bS ⇒ θB2 ≥ αSαB θS
Let the utility in this case be denoted by us1.
us1 =
∫ hB
αS
αB
θS
[ ∫ hB
θB2
[(αBθB2 + αSθS
2
)− θS]dθB1]dθB2
=
∫ hB
αS
αB
θS
[
θS(
αS
2
− 1)(hB − θB2) + αB
2
θB2(hB − θB2)
]
dθB2
= θ3S(
5α3S
12α2B
− α
2
S
2α2B
) + θ2S(−
3α2ShB
4αB
+
αShB
αB
) + θS(
αS
4
− 1
2
)h2B + (
αBh
3
B
12
)
(15)
2. bB2 ≥ bB1 ⇒ θB2 ≥ θB1 and bB1 ≥ bS ⇒ θB1 ≥ αSαB θS
Let the utility in this case be denoted by us2. Since the two buyers are symmetric, the utility in this case comes to
be same as in case 1.
us2 = θ
3
S(
5α3S
12α2B
− α
2
S
2α2B
) + θ2S(−
3α2ShB
4αB
+
αShB
αB
) + θS(
αS
4
− 1
2
)h2B + (
αBh
3
B
12
) (16)
3. bB1 ≥ bS ⇒ θB1 ≥ αSαB θS and bB2 ≤ bS ⇒ θB2 ≤ αSαB θS
Let the utility in this case be denoted by us3.
us3 =
∫ αS
αB
θS
lB
[ ∫ hB
αS
αB
θS
[(αBθB1 + αSθS
2
)− θS]dθB1]dθB2
=
∫ αS
αB
θS
lB
[
θS(
αS
2
− 1)(hB − θS) + αB
4
(h2B − θ2S)
]
dθB2
= θ3S(
α2S
α2B
− 3α
3
S
4α2B
) + θ2S(
α2ShB
2αB
+
3α2SlB
4αB
− αShB
αB
− αSlB
αB
) + θS(
αSh
2
B
4
− hBlB(αS
2
− 1))− αBh
2
BlB
4
(17)
4. bB2 ≥ bS ⇒ θB2 ≥ αSαB θS and bB1 ≤ bS ⇒ θB1 ≤ αSαB θS
Let the utility in this case be denoted by us4. Since the two buyers are symmetric, the utility in this case comes to
be same as in case 3.
us4 = θ
3
S(
α2S
α2B
− 3α
3
S
4α2B
) + θ2S(
α2ShB
2αB
+
3α2SlB
4αB
− αShB
αB
− αSlB
αB
) + θS(
αSh
2
B
4
− hBlB(αS
2
− 1))− αBh
2
BlB
4
(18)
6
Now assuming that the seller decides to fix its αS before even seeing its own type, then we find the utility to be -
US =
∫ hS
lS
uSdθS
=
∫ hS
lS
(us1 + us2 + us3 + us4)dθS = 2
∫ hS
lS
(us1 + us3)dθS
= 2
∫ hS
lS
[
θ3S(
α2S
2α2B
− α
3
S
3α2B
) + θ2S(
3α2SlB
4αB
− αSlB
αB
− α
2
ShB
4αB
)
+ θS(
αSh
2
B
2
− hBlB(αS
2
− 1)− h
2
B
2
) +
αBh
3
B
12
− αBh
2
BlB
4
]
dθS
(19)
Now, differentiating w.r.t αS and equating to 0 to find maxima
∂US
∂αS
= 0
⇒
[
(
h4S − l4S
4
)(
αS
α2B
− α
2
S
α2B
) + (
h3S − l3S
3
)(
3αSlB
2αB
− lB
αB
− αShB
2αB
) + (
h2S − l2S
2
)(−hBlB
2
+
h2B
2
)
]
= 0
⇒ − α
2
S
4α2B
(h4S − l4S) +
αS
αB
(
h4S − l4S
4αB
+
(h3S − l3S)(3lB − hB)
6
)
− lB
αB
(
h3S − l3S
3
) + (
h2S − l2S
2
)(−hBlB
2
+
h2B
2
) = 0
(20)
From Equation (14), we have a bi-variate cubic equation in αB and αS , and from Equation (20), we have a bi-variate
quadratic equation in αB and αS .
Assuming αS 6= 0 and αB 6= 0 (non-zero bids), and putting lS = lB = 0 and hS = hB = 1 in Equation (14), we get
−4αB
3αS
+
1
αS
= 0
⇒ αB = 3
4
(21)
Now, putting αB = 34 (from Equation (21)), lS = lB = 0 and hS = hB = 1 in Equation (20), we get
− α2S +
αS
2
+
9
16
= 0
⇒ αS = 1±
√
10
4
(22)
Since αS = 1−
√
10
4 < 0 (negative scaling factor), we ignore this solution.
Thus, putting lS = lB = 0 and hS = hB = 1 in Equation (14) and Equation (20), we get αS = 1+
√
10
4 ≈ 1.0406 and αB
= 34 = 0.75.
The above discussion can be summarized as the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For a single unit double auction with ACPR with two buyers and one seller, whose true types are drawn
from a 0 − 1 uniform distribution, if they deploy scaling based strategies bB1, bB2 and bS , with buyers having the same
scaling factor αB , which satisfy Equation (10) and fix their scaling factors αB and αS before seeing their true types, then
αS =
1+
√
10
4 and αB =
3
4 constitute a Nash Equilibrium.
As seen, with the increase in just one buyer, the complexity of the solution increases. It becomes increasingly difficult
to extend and generalize the above results for a realistic market setting. Thus, moving forward, taking the PowerTAC
wholesale market as testbed, we present a bidding strategy and experimentally show that it follows the theoretical results
obtained in this section.
4.2 Best Response analysis in multi-unit Double Auctions with complete information
In practice, there are key differences between double auctions implemented in markets, and the theoretical results arrived
above, stated as follows:
1. Quantity may be involved in the trading market auctions, which is not considered above.
2. The seller needs to use the same bidding strategy for one to achieve the above result, which may not the case.
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So, considering a multi-unit double auction withACPR, where bids are of the form (quantity, price). LetQa denote
the quantity not cleared of the Last Cleared Ask if it is executed partially, and let Qb denote the quantity not cleared of the
Last Cleared Bid if it is executed partially.
Claim 1. Upon clearance of an auction, either Qa or Qb, or both have to be zero.
Proof. If the last bid partially clears, Qa = 0 and Qb 6= 0, and if the last ask partially clears, Qa 6= 0 and Qb = 0. If both
clear fully, Qa = 0 and Qb = 0. The last bid and last ask both can not clear partially, as, if they did, then more quantity
can be cleared with last bid’s price higher than the last ask’s price.
Next, we propose the best response if all the other bids are known to the bidder (i.e. complete information).
Proposition 1. When a buyer (seller) has complete information about the auction, and it desires to procure (sell) entire
energy it bids (asks) for, it’s a best response to bid as close as possible to the last clearing bid (ask).
Proof. Let bi(pbi, qbi) denote the ith bid placed in the auction, for qbi amount of energy, at pbi price. Similarly, let
ai(pai, qai) denote the ith ask placed in the auction, where pai and qai denote the asking price and quantity respectively.
For simplicity, let us assume the ordering of bids to be in descending order of price, and ordering of asks to be in ascending
order of price. Therefore, pbi > pbi+1, and pai < pai+1. The last clearing bid (LCB) is denoted by bc1(pbc1 , qbc1),
while the last clearing ask (LCA) is denoted by ac2(pac2 , qac2). Thus, by ACPR, the clearing price is given as CP =
(pbc1 + pac2)/2. Let Qa denote the energy not cleared of the LCA if LCA is executed partially, and let Qb denote the
energy not cleared of the LCB if LCB is executed partially.
WLOG, let us consider the case of bids in the auction. Our claim essentially solves the optimization problem of mini-
mizing the clearing price while procuring the full amount of energy. Assume a buyermwants to place a bid bm(pbm, qbm)
in such an auction. We defineQa andQb denote the energy not cleared of last bid and last ask respectively, when the buyer
m doesn’t participate. Now if the buyer does participate in the auction, there are the following possibilities (depicted in
Figure 1):
PROOF
pbm < pbc1 pbm = pbc1 pbm > pbc1
• pbc1 > pac2 > pbm,
Qa ≥ 0, Qb ≥ 0
• pbc1 > pbm > pac2+k,
qbm ≤
∑c2+k
i=c2
qai − qac2 +Qa,
Qa ≥ 0, Qb = 0
• pbc1 > pbm > pac2+k,
qbm >
∑c2+k
i=c2
qai − qac2 +Qa,
Qa ≥ 0, Qb = 0
• pbj−1 > pbm > pbj ,
Qa ≥ 0, Qb ≥ 0,
qbm <
∑c1
i=j qbi +Qa
−Qb +
∑k
i=c2+1
qai
• pbj−1 > pbm > pbj ,
Qa ≥ 0, Qb ≥ 0,
qbm ≥
∑c1
i=j qbi +Qa
−Qb +
∑k
i=c2+1
qai
• pbm > pbj−1, Qa ≥ 0, Qb ≥ 0
Figure 1: Proof Cases
Case 1: pbm < pbc1 i.e. bid price is lower than price of the would-be cleared bid when the buyer doesn’t participate
1. pbc1 > pac2 > pbm and Qa ≥ 0, Qb ≥ 0 i.e. if the bidding price of m is lower than the ask price of the last cleared
ask (when buyer doesn’t participate). Under this condition, the bid doesn’t clear, and this is clearly not optimal, as
the buyer doesn’t get it’s required energy.
2. pbc1 > pbm > pac2+k, Qa ≥ 0 and Qb = 0 and k is the smallest index with k ≥ 0 such that qbm ≤
∑c2+k
i=c2
qai −
qac2 + Qa, i.e. if the last cleared bid is fully executed when buyer doesn’t participate, and buyer m’s bid price is
higher than the next closest ask. In this case, clearly, bm becomes the last clearing bid, and it gets cleared fully.
Thus, buyer m gets energy at the lowest price possible by having the last cleared bid.
3. pbc1 > pbm > pac2+k, where Qa ≥ 0 and Qb = 0 and k is the largest index with k ≥ 0 such that qbm >∑c2+k
i=c2
qai − qac2 + Qa, i.e. if the last cleared bid is fully executed when buyer doesn’t participate, and buyer
m’s bid price is higher than the next ask. In this case, clearly, bm becomes the last clearing bid, and it gets cleared
partially. Although the buyer m gets some energy at the lowest price possible by having the last cleared bid, it
would’ve been better off bidding higher than the previous bid bc, in order to clear it’s entire bid energy qbm.
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Case 2: pbm = pbc1 i.e. bidding price same as the last cleared bid’s price (when buyer doesn’t participate). This is
a probability zero event, and extremely unlikely to occur. Since it’s a tie, it’ll either be treated as Case 1 or Case 3,
depending on the tiebreaker rule set by the auction.
Case 3: pbm > pbc1 i.e. bidding price is just higher than the last cleared bid’s price (when buyer doesn’t participate)
1. pbj−1 > pbm > pbj and Qa ≥ 0, Qb ≥ 0, where j is the largest index with j ≤ c1 such that qbm ≤
∑c1
i=j qbi +
Qa −Qb +
∑k
i=c2+1
qai and k is the largest index such that pak ≤ pbj . In this case, bm clears fully and becomes
the second last bid to clear, and bj clears partially, or bm clears fully and becomes the last cleared bid. If the buyer
decides to bid below pbj , it’ll clear partially, which is not desirable, and thus supports our claim.
2. pbj−1 > pbm > pbj and Qa ≥ 0, Qb ≥ 0, where j is the smallest index such that qbm >
∑c1
i=j qbi +Qa −Qb +∑k
i=c2+1
qai and k is the largest index such that pak ≤ pbj . In this case, bm becomes the last clearing bid, and
executes partially. The buyer is better off bidding higher than bj−1 as it would’ve cleared fully.
3. pbm > pbj−1 andQa ≥ 0,Qb ≥ 0, where j is the largest index such that qbm ≤
∑c1
i=j qbi+Qa−Qb+
∑k
i=c2+1
qai
and k is the largest index such that pak ≤ pbj . In this case, bm clears fully. But, the buyer m would get the full
amount of energy even if it bid between pbj−1 and pbj , and would’ve then become close to the clearing bid.
Given the above proposition in a complete information setting, we further propose a MDP-based bidding strategy,
which uses the past auction trends and statistics, to achieve the best response with incomplete information in the Power-
TAC wholesale market.
5 MDPLCPBS: PowerTAC Wholesale Market Bidding Strategy
We introduce the MDP and LCP based Bidding Strategy (MDPLCPBS) for the PowerTAC wholesale market. The Power-
TAC wholesale market accepts bids of the form (energy amount, limit-price). With respect to a broker, let the energy
amount being sold be positive, while the energy amount being bought be negative. Meanwhile, let negative price indicate
a broker is earning revenue, while positive price indicate it is paying or losing revenue. Thus, from the viewpoint of a
broker, a buy order is seen to have a negative energy amount and a positive limit-price, while a sell order (termed as
an ask), is seen to have a positive energy amount and a negative limit-price.
At timeslot t, assuming a broker has a predicted demand profile Dt = {dt+1, dt+2, . . . , dt+24}, where di is the
predicted net demand at timeslot i. Also, let Pt = {pt+1, pt+2, . . . , pt+24} denote the amount of energy already procured
by past energy contracts, where pi denotes the energy procured for timeslot i. Thus, the remaining energy to be procured
is given by Et = {et+1, et+2, . . . , et+24}, where ei = di − pi is the net energy left to be procured for timeslot i. The
bidding strategy, MDPLCPBS, to procure the aforementioned energy requirements, comprises of three major submodules
- (i) Limit Price Predictor, (ii) Quantity Predictor, and (iii) Last Cleared Price Predictor.
5.1 Limit Price Predictor (LPP)
At any given timeslot t, the predictor computes 24 limit-prices for 24 simultaneous PDAs in the PowerTAC wholesale
market. Motivated by Tesauro and Bredin [2002] and Urieli and Stone [2014], the Limit Price Predictor uses the following
MDP to place optimal limit-prices for bids:
1. States: s ∈ S = {0, 1, . . . , 24, success}, s0 := 24
2. Actions: limit-price ∈ R
3. Transition: The same state transition from Urieli and Stone [2014] is used. A state s ∈ {1, . . . , 24} transitions to
one of two states. If a bid is partially or fully cleared, it transitions to the terminal state success. Otherwise, a state
s transitions to state s − 1. The clearing (i.e. transition) probability pcleared(s, limit-price) is initially unknown
and is determined by Equation (24).
4. Reward: At any state s ∈ {1, . . . , 24}, the reward is 0. At terminal state s = 0, the reward is the negative of the
balancing price per unit energy. At terminal state s = success, the reward is the negative of the limit-price of
the cleared bid. Since we take the price to be positive for bids and negative for asks, maximizing reward results in
minimizing costs.
5. Terminal States: {0, success}
9
We solve the above MDP using a sequential bidding strategy, that computes the optimal bid limit-price that minimizes
the expected procurement cost per unit energy. It uses the balancing-price as the expected price at state s = 0, and
recursively minimizes the expected cost by using the probability of clearance, pcleared(s, limit-price). This solution is
summarized as a value function, stated as follows:
V (s) =

balancing-price, if s = 0
min
limit-price
{pcleared × limit-price
+(1− pcleared)× V (s− 1)}, if s ∈ [1, 24]
(23)
Given that the balancing-price and the pcleared values are different for bids and asks, we maintain two separate instances
of the MDP, and solve them independently.
The value function in Equation (23) is solved recursively using dynamic programming. However, before doing so,
the balancing-price and the transition function pcleared(s, limit-price) need to be estimated, as they are both initially
unknown. The balancing-price is estimated by averaging the balancing-prices across past timeslots. On the other hand,
the clearing probability, pcleared(s, limit-price), is computed using past auction statistics as:
pcleared =
∑
ac∈auction[s],ac.LCP<limit-price ac.cleared-amount∑
ac∈auction[s] ac.cleared-amount
(24)
where auction[s] is the set of all past auctions in the state s, and LCP is the Last Clearing Price, which is estimated by
the Last Cleared Price Predictor. The auction statistics for each state s are re-used in the future for estimating pcleared,
as we iterate over the same sequence of states S during the bidding process.
5.2 Quantity Predictor (QP)
The Quantity Predictor is primarily responsible for distributing the demand for a target timeslot across all the 24 auctions,
in order to further reduce overall energy cost. The idea is to buy more and sell less at cheaper prices, and vice-versa. It
essentially breaks down the demand for a target timeslot t+ 24, across auctions in timeslots {t, t+ 1, . . . , t+ 23}.
For each auction state s ∈ {1, . . . , 24} at timeslot t, it takes the corresponding energy requirement et+s and uses the
24 limit-prices from the Limit Price Predictor to distribute the required energy. The energy quantity to bid/ask, for each
state s at timeslot t, is given by:
q(s) =

et+s∑24
j=s
limit-price[j]
limit-price[s]
, if et+s > 0
et+s∑24
j=s
limit-price[s]
limit-price[j]
, if et+s < 0
0, if et+s = 0
(25)
where s ∈ {1, . . . , 24}, limit-price[s] is the limit-price for state s determined by the Limit Price Predictor. The first
case in Equation (25) refers to the situation where energy needs to sold, so the bid quantity is directly proportional to
the predicted limit-price of that auction - essentially selling more energy at higher price. On the other hand, the second
case occurs when the energy needs to be procured. So, the bid quantity is set to be inversely proportional to the predicted
limit-price i.e. buying more energy at cheaper price. Thus, the final bid is of the form (q(s), limit-price[s]).
5.3 Last Cleared Price Predictor (LCPP)
First, one has to note that, in any auction, the LCP is greater than or equal to CP. Mostly, LCP > CP , as P (LCP =
CP ) = 0, i.e. LCP equal to CP is a probability zero event. In PowerTAC, the LCP is not known to any broker. In essence,
one can place better bids if the LCP for each auction is known, as they can bid higher than a predicted LCP to become
the last bid, and achieve best response according to Proposition 1. The Last Cleared Price Predictor essentially tries to
determine the LCP for bids and asks for all executed auctions. It does so by probing the auctions with a set of dummy
orders, which have the minimum tradeable energy as quantity (0.01 MwH), and limit-prices equally spaced in the range
[β × limit-price, balancing-price]. After execution, the LCP for bids for an auction in state s is determined by:
LCP (s) = min(dummy-bidscleared, limit-price[s]cleared) (26)
where dummy-bidscleared is the set of bid prices of all dummy bids which got cleared in the state s, and
limit-price[s]cleared is the limit-price for the cleared final bid made in state s (taken to be infinity if final bid did not
clear or does not exist). Similarly, the LCP for asks is given as:
LCP (s) = max(dummy-askscleared, limit-price[s]cleared) (27)
where dummy-askscleared is the set of ask prices of all dummy asks which got cleared in the state s, and
limit-price[s]cleared is the limit-price for the cleared final ask made in state s (taken to be infinity if final ask did not clear
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Algorithm 1 MDPLCPBS
1: procedure MDPLCPBS(energyReq[1..24])
2: marketData[0..24]← getMarketStatistics()
3: if EnoughDataPoints(marketData) then
4: bidPrices[1..24]← SolveMDP (marketData)
5: bidQty[1..24]← SpreadQty(energyReq, bidPrices)
6: else
7: bidPrices[1..24]← SampleBiddingPolicy()
8: bidQty[1..24]← energyReq[1..24]
9: end if
10: sendBids(bidPrices, bidQty)
11: sendDummyBids(bidPrices,marketData)
12: end procedure
or does not exist). These LCP values are then used to update the clearing probability pcleared in Equation (24). Algorithm
1 summarizes MDPLCPBS, which is executed every timeslot. It takes the energy requirement for the 24 auctions as input.
First it collects the market statistics, which includes the LCP estimate and clearing amount from previous timeslots, and
the balancing price (line 2). If the number of data points is suitable enough (taken to be 24 in our implementation), it pro-
ceeds to solve the MDP and generates a set of prices to bid (line 4). Using these set of prices, and the energy requirements,
it generates a set of quantities to bid (line 5). If data points are not enough, the bidding policy given in the PowerTAC
sample-broker is used to determine the bid prices (line 7), and the bid quantities are set as the full energy requirements
(line 8). Using the determined bid prices and quantities, we place the actual bids (line 10), and a set of dummy bids in
the market (line 11). The time complexity of Algorithm 1 comes out to be in the order of the number of past market data
points.
6 Experimental Analysis
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2: Net cost comparison of strategies across games with different energy requirements
We first analyze if our proposed bidding strategy, MDPLCPBS, follows the Nash Equilibrium derived above, and then
benchmark it against the baseline and competing state-of-the-art strategies.
6.1 Validation Experiments
Fixed seller’s scale factor and corresponding buyer’s scale factor Fixed buyer’s scale factor and corresponding seller’s scale factor
Scaling Factor 0.948689
(-0.1)
0.998689
(-0.05)
1.048689
(Theoretical Value)
1.098689
(+0.05)
1.148689
(+0.1)
0.791386
(-0.1)
0.841386
(-0.05)
0.891386
(Theoretical Value)
0.941386
(+0.05)
0.991386
(+0.1)Statistic
Average 0.772435 0.804782 0.838087 0.863553 0.907389 0.989438 1.057427 1.113121 1.226423 1.616557
Std. Dev. 0.033287 0.037697 0.025127 0.020749 0.036637 0.033287 0.037697 0.025127 0.020749 0.036637
Table 1: OBOS - Experimental scale factors values for buyer and seller using MDPLCPBS
We take the Power TAC simulator and isolate the wholesale market, and remove all market simulator participants
(GenCos, internal buyers) from the market. We test the one buyer one seller (OBOS) scenario by deploying only two
agents in the isolated wholesale market - a buyer and a seller. These agents have a fixed energy demand that they need
to buy (sell) from the market. In these experiments, we set the energy demand to be the previous slot’s tariff market net
demand, which both the buyer and seller are notified about. We draw θB ∼ U [40, 80] and θS ∼ U [40, 80], and compute
11
the theoretical scale factors using Equation (9) and Equation (8). We run two batches of experiments, with 30 games in
each set of the batch, for 5 sets per batch. During each batch, one of the agents has a fixed scaling based bidding strategy,
while the other uses MDPLCPBS.
In the first (second) batch, we draw the seller’s (buyer’s) valuation θS ∼ U [40, 80] (θB ∼ U [40, 80]), and apply
a fixed scale factor within ±0.1 of the theoretical value. The buyer (seller) generates its valuation θB ∼ U [40, 80]
(θB ∼ U [40, 80]), and uses this valuation as the balancing-price in MDPLCPBS to generate bids.
The experimental average scale factor and standard deviation, for cleared bids, for the buyer and the seller in the two
batches of experiments are documented in Table 1. The table demonstrates that in a one buyer and one seller setting, MD-
PLCPBS approaches the Nash Equilibrium characterized for a single unit OBOS double auction. The values demonstrate
that as the fixed scale factor for the seller is increased, the buyer’s scale factor increases slowly. On the contrary, when the
fixed scale factor for the buyer is increased, the seller’s scale factor increases rapidly.
6.2 Benchmarks
We isolate the PowerTAC wholesale market from the full PowerTAC simulator while keeping the market simulator partic-
ipants (GenCos, internal buyers) and weather simulator, and benchmark the performance of MDPLCPBS. The following
agents/brokers are used in these benchmarks:
• Zero Intelligence (ZI): The ZI agent Gode and Sunder [1993] uses a randomized bid strategy and ignores the market
state. It generates random order prices, ignoring the state of the market. In our experiments, we derive its bids from
a uniform distribution with mean µ and a standard deviation of $10. The mean µ taken from the limit price predicted
by the MDP in TacTex Urieli and Stone [2014]. The broker places one bid per auction, and the remaining required
energy as the bid quantity. It continues to do the same for all the 24 bidding opportunities, or until the required
energy is procured.
• Zero Intelligence Plus (ZIP): The ZIP agent Tesauro and Das [2001] maintains a scalar variable m denoting its
desired profit margin, and it combines this with a unit’s limit price to compute a bid price p. For each failed trade,
the price is adjusted by small increments to beat the failed bid price p. In our experiments, the initial limit price
value µ is determined from the limit price predicted by the MDP in TacTex. The profit margin m is set to 1% of µ,
resulting in the initial bid price to be p = µ× 1.01. If the bid fails, the next bid price is incremented by 10% of µ.
Then, the new bid price is given by p = µ× 1.11.
• TacTex: The TacTex Urieli and Stone [2014] agent uses an MDP based model and dynamic programming to deter-
mine limit-prices for bids. The algorithm described in the paper was implemented and used in our experiments.
• MCTS: The MCTS Chowdhury et al. [2018] agent uses a Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) coupled with heuristics
on top of the limit price derived from a REPTree based limit price predictor, to determine the optimal bid price.
In our experiments, we used the MCTS-dyn-C2 version with 10000 iterations, which is shown to be the best
performing variation of the MCTS bidding strategy.
For a timeslot t + 24 in the future, having 24 bidding opportunities in timeslots {t, t + 1, . . . , t + 23}, the energy to
be procured is set to be same across all the brokers. This energy amount for t+ 24 is determined as some fraction of the
net demand in timeslot t in the PowerTAC simulation tariff market. Four sets of 10 games each are simulated, with each
set having a different fraction of the net demand to be procured. The fraction set is given by {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}.
Figure 2 shows the net cost of all the agents across the four sets of games. In each case, MDPLCPBS outperforms ZI,
ZIP and TacTex on a consistent basis, while losing out to MCTS. While ZIP may seem to perform reasonably well in some
cases, it can be countered easily in strategic settings, like in single-shot single-unit auction setting, whereas MDPLCPBS
follows the equilibrium. It is also to be noted that, while MCTS uses tailored heuristics, MDPLCPBS is derived from the
game theoretic analysis of single shot double auction (Proposition 1). We leave the game theoretic analysis of MCTS for
future work.
% of Market
Demand Statistic
State
24 23 22 21 20
100
Wt. Avg. Relative Error (%) 9.35 10.4 7.59 6.66 8.34
Std. Dev. of % Error 13.47 26.76 21.00 21.38 44.71
Avg. Cleared Quantity 885.76 34.87 23.08 17.17 14.36
50
Wt. Avg. Relative Error (%) 15.18 24.03 10.28 10.96 16.36
Std. Dev. of % Error 20.79 46.31 33.35 32.82 53.51
Avg. Cleared Quantity 836.82 22.19 13.54 8.89 6.92
Table 2: Weighted relative error rate for LCP prediction
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Table 2 summarizes the weighted relative error rates (weighed by cleared quantity) in predicting the LCP. 82% of
the total cleared energy for a future timeslot is cleared in the first auction itself, with 91% of the total being cleared in
the first five. Since the cleared energy of the other states is extremely low, their corresponding predicted LCPs have less
impact on the pcleared calculation. Thus, we focus on the error rates of the states corresponding to the first five auctions
for a target timeslot. We see that MDPLCPBS has a 10% and 15% error rate in the LCP prediction for the first auction
of a timeslot (state 24), for 100% and 50% of the market demand as requirement. Moreover, the corresponding weighted
average relative error across all states, comes out to be 12% and 18% respectively. The error rates increase as requirement
decrease, as there are more low quantity bids by brokers and Miso buyer’s low bids often set the LCP. Thus, MDPLCPBS
predicts the LCP with minimal error, during auctions where most of the energy gets traded.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we first analytically characterized Nash Equilibrium strategies for a single unit double auction with the
clearing price and payment rule as ACPR, for OBOS, and TBOS with scale based bidding strategies. We also proposed the
best response in a complete information setting in a multi-unit double auction with ACPR. Based on these formulations,
we presented MDPLCPBS, a bidding strategy for PDAs. Furthermore, we experimentally validated that MDPLCPBS
achieves the Nash Equilibrium derived for single unit double auction with ACPR for OBOS. Finally, we benchmarked
MDPLCPBS against the baseline and competing state-of-the-art strategies, and showed that it outperforms most of them
consistently. Simultaneously, we showed that it predicts the LCP with minimal error.
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